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"No God-Damned Thailander Can Be Trusted to Do a Job Without Getting
Political Minded": The Free Thai Movement and the Politics of Independence
During World War II
Nobchulee (Dawn) Maleenont
On December 8, 1941, following the attack on Pearl Harbor, the imperial forces of Japan invaded Thailand, a small
independent country on the other side of the Pacific, as a part of its campaign to bring about the so-called 'Greater
East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.' Without any hope of a successful opposition against Japan's advance, the Thai
government, led by military dictator Premier Plaek Phibunsongkhram, surrendered and joined the Axis. The event
sparked pockets of resistance to emerge within and outside the country, all working towards the common goal to
regain Thailand's independence. By the end of the war, these anti-Japanese organizations would become known as
a single movement called the 'Free Thai.'[1] The Free Thai Movement is one of the most important turning points
in Thai history. It is due to the efforts of its members that the people of Thailand have been able to enjoy
autonomy since the end of World War II while the country's 'official' partners in the Axis camp suffered the fate of
a defeated enemy. In addition, the Free Thai Movement shaped domestic political developments, and played a key
role in mapping Thailand's diplomatic relations in the postwar world. Free Thai historiography has generally
established that the movement was dictated by two important factors: its members' desire to restore national
sovereignty and the involvement of the Allies. However, a close examination of the China mission in 1943 reveals a
powerful undercurrent. Interpersonal politics within the movement, shaped by sociopolitical realities at home, not
only greatly influenced the organization itself, but was also intimately linked to the Allies' effort to liberate
Thailand.
Despite its significance, the Free Thai Movement remains a black hole in Thai history. Primary sources are
extremely scarce.[2] Official documents are hardly anywhere to be found in Thailand, and published memoirs of
members of the movement tend to be very generic and clinical; they reveal little about what authors felt or
thought about their experiences during the movement. Primary sources written after the war also lack personal
opinion and political voice. Lt. Dr. Chanai Reuangsiri, one of the Free Thai officers sent to China, for instance,
admitted that he had "filtered out things that would offend other people [in the movement], so much so that this
has become almost like a guide book."[3] Furthermore, the little available Thai historiography on the subject is too
much bathed in idealism and nationalism to offer an objective assessment. Khabuankan Seri Thai, the only official
textbook about the movement, published by the Thai Ministry of Education, is a two-hundred page
commemorative tale filled with romanticized patriotic heroism. It portrays the resistance as an ideologically unified
anti-Japanese movement, separated only by geography, the lack of good communications during wartime, and
political conflicts between (Allied) countries.[4] The text makes no mention of the conflicts among the Thais
themselves.
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However, one Western-educated Thai scholar has taken a completely opposite line. Sorasak Ngamcachonkulkid,
using prosopography, or collective biography, argued the Free Thai Movement was "more a response to the
domestic politics than to the war or the Japanese occupation."[5] He concluded that the movement was "an
alliance of those who opposed Phibun's military dictatorship" rather than the Japanese presence; the war merely
"gave these leaders a perfect opportunity to take advantage of Phibun's wartime difficulties."[6] While I agree that
"the democratic conflicts and changes of Thai domestic politics,"[7] had a tremendous impact on the dynamic of
the Free Thai Movement, evidence has shown that it did so in a manner far more complex, subtle, and unwanted
than Ngamcachonkulkid has argued. By emphasizing party politics in Thailand and turning the war into a mere
background, Ngamcachonkulkid completely neglected the efforts of the overseas Free Thai groups, whose
collaboration with the Allies were vital to the movement's success and to Thailand's independence.
E. Bruce Reynolds, the author of Thailand's Secret War: OSS, SOE, and the Free Thai Underground during World
War II, the most comprehensive critical work on the subject, adopted a more balanced approach. He explored
various factors that influenced the Free Thai Movement, including Thai politics, although with a tendency to
concentrate on the race between the Allies to "promote their own influence in Bangkok after the war."[8] Still,
because the Free Thai Movement was, to borrow Reynolds' words, "a very tangled skein,"[9] it is not enough to
examine how the three factors, namely the goal to regain independence, the Allies and Thai politics, affected the
movement. A better understanding of this chapter of Thai history requires, in addition, a careful analysis of the
relationship between the factors themselves.
It was only a few hours after the Japanese invasion began when Phibun, the pro-Japanese premier, ordered
surrender and subsequently signed an alliance pact with Japan, which included a declaration of war on the United
States and Great Britain.[10] Residents who resented Phibun's decision immediately began to form underground
resistance cells in Thailand. Meanwhile, in Washington, M.R. Seni Pramoj, Thai Minister to the United States, took
a more public and radical stand against the Japanese-Thai alliance. He refused to hand over the declaration of war
to the United States government and severed ties with his own, as he deemed it "no longer a free and responsible
government for Thailand."[11] This proved to be one of the crucial moves that determined the fate of the country
at the end of the war. Pramoj recalled Secretary of State Cordell Hull's response to his decision: "If you refuse to
declare war, we can't declare war against you. You still represent Thailand to us," said Hull.[12] Accordingly, the
United States government never declared war on Thailand and continued to recognize the country as "an
independent state ... under the military occupation of Japan."[13]
Pramoj did not stop there. His goal was to protect his diplomatic standing as Thai Minister to the United States and
maintain the official recognition of the Thai Legation in Washington, for he believed, "as long as there is still a
Royal Thai Legation, then Thailand is still considered free."[14] Pramoj was also determined to establish a Free Thai
movement in America (FTM), in order to show the Allies that Thai patriots were committed to the Allied cause, and
by doing so, he hoped that Thailand would not be regarded as a defeated enemy when the Allies eventually win
the war. The minister thus called for Thai volunteers in America, most of whom were college students, to fight for
the Allies, so that when the Japanese were finally defeated, he said, "we will have a right to win back our
independence."[15] In doing so, Pramoj won the sympathy and support of high officials in the State Department,
including Hull, Maxwell Hamilton, head of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, and Assistant Secretary of State
Adolph Berle Jr., who, according to the minister, patted him on the back and called him "our first ally."[16]
Throughout the war, the State Department continued to regard Pramoj as the sole legal representative of
Thailand. In addition, Thai funds in the United States, which had been frozen by the American government at the
outbreak of the war in the Pacific, were also released to be appropriated for the purposes of the liberation
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movement. Therefore, the FTM was, to an extent, an autonomous entity; it was supported by the United States
government, but funded by Thailand's own financial assets. The movement received another major boost when it
came under the auspices of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), a US wartime intelligence agency that was
planning to launch covert operations in Japanese-occupied Asia and wage psychological and guerilla warfare
against Imperial Japan. The OSS would become the organizer of all FTM military operations. And in the spring of
1943, a group of Thai students trained by the agency, embarked on the Free Thai movement's first mission in warridden Nationalist China.
The FTM inspired the establishment of a British branch of the Free Thai, known as the Free Siamese movement
(FSM). Nevertheless, despite the fact that the FSM shared the basic goals of the FTM and initially aspired to join its
sister organization, the nature of the Britain-based organization was very different from the one that emerged in
the United States and the two groups did not unite or collaborate until late in the war. This was mostly because
Great Britain's wartime attitude and policy toward Thailand differed greatly from those of the United States. Unlike
Pramoj, the minister in London handed over the Thai government's declaration of war to the British, and as a
result, Britain declared war on Thailand. Thai citizens remaining in England were now considered "enemy
aliens,"[17] and it gravely complicated the formation of a Thai resistance there. The British government considered
that Thailand, by surrendering and allying with the Japanese, had betrayed the neutrality agreement previously
made between them, and had caused British Malaya to fall into the hands of the enemy.[18] Sir Andrew Gilchrist, a
British officer who had been stationed in Thailand before the war, observed contrarily that "the fullest resistance
of which the Siamese were capable would not have slowed down the Japanese conquest of Malaya by two
hours."[19] Nevertheless, the fall of Thailand made the British realize the strategic importance of Thailand as the
key to the stability of their Southeast Asian Empire. Accordingly, Britain's policy now included a much greater
influence in postwar Thailand and even a possible annexation of the southern portion of the country in order to
safeguard British possessions in Malaya.
In August 1942, the British government finally permitted the Thais to officially establish the Free Siamese
movement, but on the condition that they "agreed to join the Pioneer Corps," the manual labor unit in the British
Army that the Thais dreaded and looked down upon.[20] The government also stressed that the recognition of the
resistance was "not equivalent to the recognition of an exile government."[21] More importantly, the Free Siamese
movement did not enjoy independence like the FTM in the United States. Free Siamese officers earned their
salaries from the British Army as British soldiers and operated entirely under British command.
Britain's hostile policy toward Thailand had an effect on the Anglo-American alliance in the Pacific theater. British
colonialist policy contradicted American political ideology, which painted the United States as the champion of
Asian liberty. As a result, the British and the Americans would work in competition against one another, instead of
in cooperation, until almost the end of the war, and it would hinder the progress of the Thai liberation movement.
Meanwhile, a powerful underground resistance was also established inside Thailand. This movement was headed
by Pridi Banomyong, one of the most influential figures in Thai politics. Together with his close political allies, Pridi
formed the National Liberation Movement (NLM), initially codenamed 'X.O. Group,' which eventually became the
core of the entire Thai liberation effort and expanded into a nationwide network by the end of the war. The
objectives of Pridi's resistance group were two-fold: to expel the Japanese and to ensure that the Allies would
recognize Thailand's sovereignty after the war. Pramoj's success in the United States prompted the NLM leaders to
send a delegate out via China to establish contact with the resistance groups in America and England and make the
following requests to the Western Allies: 1) that the Allies consider the Thai government's declaration of war null
and void, 2) that the non-aggression pact made between Thailand and the Allies before the war continues to be
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upheld, 3) that the United States and Great Britain lend funds and equipment to the Thai resistance's guerilla
warfare against the Japanese forces occupying Thailand, 4) that the Allies facilitate the evacuation of the NLM
leaders from Thailand, and 5) that they sanction and support the establishment of a Thai government in exile in
British India.[22]
To that end, the NLM high command chose to send Chamkad Balankura, the twenty-eight year-old secretary of the
X.O Group, who was to "exfiltrate" to China. Balankura was then to seek help from Nationalist Chinese, to act as a
middleman for him to communicate with the British and Americans, until he could manage to get to either
Washington or London. The NLM preferred to work with the Western Allies rather than the Chinese. The United
States had shown its friendliness by dismissing the Thai declaration of war. Moreover, Pramoj's success in
establishing the FTM indicated that the Americans were willing to support the Thais' cause. As for Great Britain,
despite its declaration of war on Thailand, Pridi still hoped that the long-established friendship between the two
countries would convince the British to consider the Thai resistance a worthwhile investment. Pridi also had
personal connections with several British officials who had been in Bangkok before the war, particularly Sir Josiah
Crosby, former British Minister to Thailand, whom the Thai leader was convinced knew of the movement's
existence. In addition, Gilchrist received a secret message from the X.O. Group before he left for England. Gilchrist
recalled in his book, Bangkok Top Secret, that "the note contained the first indication of the genuine existence
inside Siam of the Free Siamese Movement."[23] Because of this, Pridi expected that when the time came for him
to ask for help, Britain would respond positively.
On the other hand, even though it had not officially declared war on China, the Thai government had been
increasingly hostile to the Chinese. In fact, Phibun had chosen to recognize Mao's government instead of that of
Chiang Kai Shek even before he made a pact with the Japanese. Because of this, the NLM leaders feared that
Nationalist China might not be willing to lend any substantial or genuine support to the Thai resistance movement.
But they would soon be proven wrong; the situation in China was not at all what they had thought. In the
meantime, back in the United States, conflicts within the Free Thai movement began to emerge, and they were
mostly caused by the movement's leader, Minister Pramoj himself.
Seni Pramoj is one of the most debatable (but under-debated) characters in the Free Thai Movement. His effort to
win the backing of the Americans yielded many successes. Some have considered him as the man to be credited
for Thailand's postwar independence. He has even been dubbed by foreign observers as a 'man with a golden
tongue.' Ironically, Pramoj's eloquence was never quite as successful in winning the hearts of his own countrymen.
Instead, throughout the course of the war, the minister made many ill-calculated decisions that alienated allies and
made more and more enemies among the members of the FTM. It caused a damaging and irreparable rift in the
organization. Pramoj's disagreement with Lt. Col. Kharb Kunjara, the military attaché to the Thai Legation who later
led the Free Thai military operation in China, was notoriously known as the dispute that almost destroyed the
movement. Kunjara was seen in general as a shady, slippery character. He was a known gambler, womanizer, as
well as an alcoholic. Worse still, he was a "trusted protégé of Premier Phibun,"[24] who had been sent by the latter
to keep an eye on the Thai minister and was suspected to have pro-Axis tendencies. Pramoj summed up Kunjara as
an "opportunist" incapable of "being pro anybody except himself.... with hardly enough backbone for any kind of
conviction or ideal whatsoever."[25]
Yet, the minister allowed Kunjara to lead the operation in China. This was most likely because Pramoj wanted to
remove the colonel from the movement's executive circle, where he could influence political decisions.[26] Pramoj
assumed that all the important decision-making would take place in Washington with him at the center. Kunjara,
who was soon to be sent far away on a mission, would be preoccupied with military and operational matters, and
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thus would have little chance of meddling in the political aspects of the movement. Pramoj would soon discover,
however, that he was wrong.
The rift between Pramoj and Kunjara had a damaging effect on the former's relationship with the Free Thai
students-turned-officers who believed that the minister allowed his personal conflicts to interfere with their cause.
Neither did it help that the Thai minister became extremely cautious, controlling, and by-the-book in every matter
concerning the movement or Thailand's future. Pramoj's hands-on approach was detrimental not only to his
relationship with the other members of the FTM, but also to the movement itself. The students decided to form
the Free Thai Committee (FTC), a voting board that included two student representatives who would "act as
intermediaries," since "M.R. Seni and M.L. Kharb, couldn't get along with each other," recalled Chok na Ranong,
the most vocal student in the FTM.[27] The fact that the Free Thai officers had different leadership ideas caused
more dissention between them and Pramoj. The students regarded the FTC as "the only entity to which we owe
allegiance."[28] Accordingly, Chok related, the "Legation look on us as rivals, because with the [FTC] in existence,
the Legation would no longer be our superior."[29] But the FTC, by giving the students voting power, also pulled
them into the political arena -- a place that the Free Thais tried, but were never quite able to stay away from.
In the summer and fall of 1943, several developments in China created further conflicts among the Free Thai
members that would threaten the success of the movement. Kunjara and a group of Free Thai officers were sent to
China to find a way to "infiltrate" Thailand. However, insufficient equipment and reconnaissance, inter-Allied
politics, as well as delays imposed by the Chinese put their operation on hold for months. It created a window for
the young and eager officers to become involved in the politics and intrigue set up by the Chinese and Allied
individuals who hoped to benefit from the movement. The Free Thai operation in China was under the supervision
of the Sino-American Cooperative Organization (SACO).[30] Its joint chiefs, General Tai Li, head of Chiang Kai Shek's
secret police, and United States Navy Captain Milton Miles, played key roles in delaying and diverting the progress
of the Thai resistance in 1943. Tai Li, who saw great potential in the Thai liberation movement in helping China
strengthen its position in postwar Asia, tried to steer the movement toward that direction. On the other hand,
Miles, who enjoyed a great deal of power and prestige because of SACO and his personal relationship with Tai Li,
tried to appease the Chinese rather than do what was needed to help the Thai liberation effort.
Meanwhile, Chamkad Balankura, the representative of the NLM, had reached Chungking and immediately tried to
contact the FTM and the Western Allies. His most important objectives were to secure the Allies' support for the
movement and the Thai exile government, which the NLM hoped to set up in India, and to ensure that they would
guarantee Thailand's sovereignty after the war. However, Balankura and his leaders back home underestimated
the difficulties that lay in establishing communication with the Allies and in persuading them to support the Free
Thai cause. The NLM's greatest mistake was sending as its representative the young and inexperienced Balankura,
who was virtually a nobody in the Thai political circle.[31] As a result, Sir Crosby, Pridi's longtime acquaintance,
completely dismissed Balankura. The former British minister in Thailand insisted that he had never heard of the
X.O. Group and refused to believe that an insignificant and unknown figure like Balankura really represented Pridi
Banomyong.[32] In addition, the British Embassy in Chungking brushed the young delegate off, warning him to
stop sending letters to the legation.[33]
th

The biggest blow to Balankura's hope came on the 25 of May when the British government sent a memo to the
Chinese, informing them of its refusal to grant the demands of the NLM. The British Foreign Office argued on the
behalf of His Majesty the King of England that "the time is not yet ripe to support an active Free Thai Movement."
It, in addition, criticized Balankura for having "gone off at half cock and come out with no carefully laid-out plan,"
as well as stated, "the Siamese army will be a hindrance rather than a help" to the Allies. Most importantly, the

Voces Novae, Vol 2, No 1 (2010) 85

Published by Chapman University Digital Commons, 2018

5

Voces Novae, Vol. 2 [2018], Art. 12
Nobchulee Maleenont

memo emphasized, "there is no question at present of His Majesty's Government helping to affect the escape of
the Free Thai leaders either by sea or by exfiltration. There is no question too of His Majesty's Government
recognising the Free Thai Government or 'unfreezing' the Siamese Government's credit."[34] This message clearly
demonstrates that the British were not ready to commit to the Thai resistance movement, especially if it would
mean any political promise by their government regarding the status of postwar Thailand. Balankura was deeply
upset by the British reply. It came as a total shock to him, for despite that the Thai military government had
declared war on Britain, it was the British who had since been "broadcasting on BBC Radio and All-India-Radio,
urging Thai people to fight alongside the Allies against the Japanese. But now that the Thais had organized an antiJapanese movement, and were starting to put Phibun in a difficult position, the British refused to support
them."[35] This caused Balankura to suspect that the British might be seeking to impose some sort of control over
postwar Thailand, annex part of it, or colonize the country all together.
The situation became increasingly frustrating for Balankura, as his attempts to establish contact with the Free Thai
movement in America were also met with great difficulty. Immediately after reaching China, with the 'help' of the
Chinese authorities, Balankura sent several telegrams to Washington to try to establish his bona fides as a member
of a genuine Thai resistance movement and ask Pramoj for funds and help get to the United States. But Pramoj
refused to provide the capital at this point and, in his reply, was unclear whether he would help arrange for
Balankura to travel to Washington or not. Kharb Kunjara informed Nicol Smith, an OSS liaison officer charged with
the care of the Free Thai officers dispatched to China, that just before he left Washington, the Thai Legation
received a message from a man named Balankura. However, Kunjara conveyed, "none of us had ever heard of such
a person, and so no money was sent."[36]
Rejected by the British and alienated by the Free Thais in America, Balankura grew desperate and was forced to
rely more and more on the Chinese, which he had tried to avoid; Balankura did not want to owe a debt to the
Chinese, fearing the uncertainty of what they would ask of Thailand in return. But when it seemed that his best
choices of allies had turned their backs on him, Balankura felt he was left with little choice. Accordingly, he sought
to depend on the Nationalist Chinese to influence their American allies to help his cause. Unfortunately, the
Chinese, especially Tai Li and his intelligence unit, caused more delays to his mission instead of expediting it. Malai
Chuphinit pointed to confusion and the complex security in wartime China as the causes that delayed Balankura's
communication with the Western Allies. Chuphinit explained, "it was impossible [for Balankura] to meet with [the
American Free Thais] until they were certain over who was who."[37]
While difficult wartime communications contributed to the delays of the Free Thai Movement in 1943, it was not
the only reason. Balankura's attempts to communicate with the FTM, the FSM, as well as with the British and
American authorities were monitored, controlled, and more importantly, manipulated by the Chinese intelligence
to suit the Nationalists' goals. Many of the messages Balankura sent out went missing under the supervision of Tai
Li's men. Pridi and Balankura's wife, who had remained in Thailand, both recalled that the radio announcement of
Balankura's arrival in Chungking was the only message from the delegate and the only news about him they
received.[38] This, according to Chatthip Natsupha, resulted in the Thai resistance dispatching another group of
representatives to Chungking in August 1943. Moreover, John B. Haseman argued that a number of messages,
"especially one that should have established [Balankura's] bona fides beyond doubt, were never delivered" to
Pramoj in Washington.[39]
So what was the Chinese goal? Why interrupt the communications between Balankura and the Western Allies? The
Nationalist Chinese, sought to gain a permanent foothold in postwar Thailand and use it as a base from which to
spread China's influence over the rest of Southeast Asia. Therefore, they wanted the Thais to establish their
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government in exile in China instead of India, which was out of the Chinese control and under their rival's, the
British. According to British intelligence, Chinese officials even bribed Balankura with $500,000 of "comfort
money," as well as promised to "advance up to $100,000,000" for a Thai government and liberation movement
based in Chungking.[40] Balankura, however, was reluctant to comply, since his instructions were to organize the
exile government with the support of the British, in India.[41] As a result, he was put in isolation, or what the
Chinese called 'protective custody.'
By late June 1943, Balankura's identity and the existence of the resistance in Thailand had been more or less
established, and Pramoj had since been keen to have the delegate flown to Washington. Nonetheless, Balankura
continued to be detained in Chungking and was not allowed to meet with the Free Thai unit from America. Phaisan
Trakunli, who had accompanied Balankura from Thailand as his translator recalled, "We heard Kharb Kunjara had
come from America. We wanted to see him, but [the Chinese authorities in] Chungking would not allow us to
meet."[42] Kunjara also tried, without success, to arrange a meeting with Balankura despite the fact that he had
established a close relationship with Tai Li. Kunjara related his frustration to Smith: "neither Captain Miles nor I
have been able to get a thing out of him [Tai Li] on this. He won't deny that Balankura is here [but] refuses to
produce him for us to question."[43] Pow Khamurai, a Thai officer in Kunjara's group voiced the same
disappointment. He pointed out that it was not until Balankura "was very sick and about to die [that Kunjara] was
finally permitted by the Chinese authorities to meet him."[44] According to Trakunli, the Chinese also made no
plans to release Balankura to United States custody. They used the excuse that Balankura should meet and consult
with Chiang Kai Shek before continuing to Washington. But, Trakunli stated, "the Chinese kept postponing our
meeting with Generalissimo Chiang, that we felt we could not believe them anymore."[45]
What the Thais did not realize was that their efforts were also hindered by the US authorities' reluctance to help
them. In fact, certain American officials in China got themselves entangled in the politics of Thai independence,
assumed that they knew better, and decided to bypass the Thais, often even the State Department, and take
matters into their own hands. John Carter Vincent, American Charge d'Affaires in Chungking, took the liberty to
assess that Balankura was "not an entirely balanced person," and advised his government to "leave to the Chinese
... the matter of handling [him]."[46] What is worse, Miles, who thought he could score points with his superiors in
Washington from a Free Thai success under his supervision, supported the Chinese plan to host the Thai
government in exile in Chungking, and made use of the existing rift among the Thais to achieve this goal. He agreed
with Tai Li not to let the pro-British Balankura meet the American Free Thai unit and reported to his government
that it was "unnecessary," "General Tai and I ... decided that Balankura was not of sufficient importance to make
any promises," he argued.[47] But it is more likely that Miles and Tai Li kept Balankura away from the Free Thais
because Balankura still wished to establish the Thai exile government in India. Had Balankura been able to discuss
these matters with Pramoj, who was more inclined toward the British than the Chinese, the plan for a Thai
government in India might have materialized, and the control of the Thai resistance could slip out of the hands of
both the Chinese and Miles. For that reason, the SACO chiefs planned to detain Balankura in China until the latter
changed his mind.
In the fall of 1943, two developments forced Miles and Tai Li to change their tactics and led to increased
interactions between the Thais from America and those from Thailand, resulting in further complications in the
effort to liberate Thailand. The first was the meeting between Balankura and Prince Subha Svasti, one of the key
players in the FSM. Notwithstanding the policy of the British Foreign Office to stay away from the business of the
NLM, the Special Operations Executive (SOE), a British counterpart of the OSS which was in charge of the FSM, had
shown an interest in Balankura ever since it was informed of his arrival in China. However, it had been unable to
communicate with him for the Chinese lied that Balankura "was already working closely with the American Free
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Thai group and therefore had no interest in meeting British representatives."[48] But all of that changed when
Prince Subha Svasti, who was working directly under the SOE commander in India, received a letter from Balankura
st
on June 21 requesting to see him. Balankura was probably able to get around the Chinese and send word out to
Subha Svasti through Trakunli, who had also been secretly contacting the British and American embassies on his
behalf while he was placed under house arrest. Thus, the first face-to-face contact between a representative of the
Thai resistance within the country and a representative of the movement abroad was made possible.
th

th

Balankura and Prince Subha Svasti met every day, from August 5 to 12 , during which Subha Svasti assuaged
Balankura's disappointment in the British, assuring him that the Atlantic Charter had made it clear that Britain
would not seek territorial gains in Thailand after the war. The prince then explained that "without a concrete proof
of the existence of this Free Siamese Movement [the NLM], supported by the majority of the Siamese population,
it would be difficult to make the British Government give a support to it, since [she does not] undertake to do
anything she feels she may not be able to carry out."[49] With this assurance, Balankura moved to rally for support
from the prince and the British. He deliberately revealed that "he had received an invitation from the Chinese
Government to set up the Siamese Provisional Government in China," and even lied that the United States had
already thrown its support behind the establishment this government.[50] Balankura also played on British fears;
he claimed that in return for guaranteeing Thailand's sovereignty, the Chinese planned to use the country "as a
base to penetrate into British Malaya."[51] The young delegate's exaggeration that the Chinese and the Americans
were already heavily involved with his liberation movement was convincing and disconcerting enough to evoke a
response from the prince. Subha Svasti hurriedly tried to persuade Balankura "not to press for a Siamese
Provisional Government in China prematurely," he said, "since such a Government would not really be free, and at
best would be like the Provisional Korean Government, which is most undesirable." The Prince also promised, "the
outlook is very bright with regard to the recognition of the Provisional Government [in British India]."[52]
Subha Svasti's promise to Balankura reflected only his own hopeful dreams. Despite that the meeting between the
two ended on a very positive note, it resulted in no real political promise from the British. It did, however, provide
the SOE with substantial information that allowed it to progress further toward the plan for the FSM officers to
infiltrate Thailand. Moreover, the meeting, along with another development from Thailand, would prompt further
involvement of certain Allied parties and heightened the rivalries within and between their agencies. The Thai
liberation movement was slowly becoming the object of contention between the three Allies, each seeking to
become the most favored nation of postwar Thailand.
In August, a new party of delegates, consisting of men who were prominent members of the Thai political scene,
exfiltrated to China, bringing tangible proof that a substantial underground resistance was at work in Thailand. This
encouraged more action on the Allies' part, but at the same time, the new delegates' presence in Chungking also
aggravated the conflict between Pramoj and Kunjara. This was due in part to the fact that unlike Balankura, the
new delegation, led by Sanguan Tularak, was much more receptive to the idea of a Sino-Thai collaboration. And
thus, when they responded positively to establishing the exile government in China, Tai Li and Miles were suddenly
keen to let them meet and bond with the Free Thai unit from America. However, things became exceedingly
complicated as the Thais were full of mistrust of one another. Tularak himself distrusted Kunjara because of the
latter's ties with Phibun, the dictatorial Thai premier. Furthermore, not only were the two men members of
competing parties before the war, but more importantly, they believed in opposite political ideologies, one
democratic, the other militaristic and dictatorial. Tularak also had doubts about Karun Kengradomying, another
Free Thai officer, whose father he believed to be dishonest and involved in illegal activities with Phibun.[53]
Balankura, too, suspected Kunjara. The latter's connection to the Thai dictator and his reputation as an
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untrustworthy man and an opportunist had been well known to Balankura long before the war started. It did not
help, either, that Pramoj had been sending him telegrams warning him not to trust the colonel.[54]
Despite all the petty politics among the Thais, it would be too hasty to assume that the relationships and conflicts
between them were dictated by ambition, especially those relating to the rivalries between different political
parties in Thailand, as Ngamcachonkulkid has argued. The dynamic between the Thais, in fact, depended more on
political principles, personal loyalty, and family alliance. Most importantly, and somewhat ironically, it was
characterized by political paranoia: the mutual distrust and fear of nearly every member of the Thai resistance that
a fellow Thai in the movement had an ambition or a hidden agenda to exploit their noble cause for his own
political gains. This was why Pramoj, Balankura and Tularak were reluctant to trust Kunjara, a man of a political
belief incompatible to their own and a man who had been until the war broke out Phibun's loyal follower. It was
also why the Thais in Chungking were so easily convinced that the FSM, supposedly led by Prince Subha Svasti, had
a goal to return to absolutist Siam with the help of the British government, a monarchical institution itself. Even
Balankura, the most pro-British person among the Thais in Chungking, did not think the idea was too farfetched.
th
After being disillusioned by the British letter of May 25 , he told Chiang Kai Shek that he suspected Britain refused
to support the pro-constitution NLM because it was planning on backing the Thai royalists in England, who desired
to restore the monarchical rule in Thailand.[55] Though Balankura's suspicion was cleared up when Subha Svasti
ensured him in their meetings that neither he nor the FSM had any intention of restoring the absolute monarchy,
the rest of the American Free Thais and NLM members were not so easily convinced.
At a glance, Prince Subha Svasti seemed like a natural leader for the Free Siamese movement. He was a genuine
patriot, whose resistance against the Japanese began as soon as the latter attacked the Allies and invaded
Thailand. On December 8, 1941, he wrote a letter to Winston Churchill offering his service to the Allied cause.[56]
From then on, he provided the British War Office with the most extensive geographical, military, and political
information on Thailand. By the time the FSM gained recognition from the British government in mid-1942, a step
forward that was partly the outcome of his effort, the prince had already earned the rank of major in the British
Army. Gilchrist even argued that Thai citizens living in England avoided being "put into internment [during the war]
due to the enthusiasm of Prince Subha Svasti."[57] The prince helped pave the way for the Free Siamese
movement to emerge in England.
Moreover, as early as the first half of 1943, when no one outside of Thailand knew for sure yet whether an
underground resistance really existed in the country, let alone whom it involved, Subha Svasti singled out Pridi
Banomyong as the greatest potential ally for the FSM. Despite the fact that they belonged to opposite political
camps, the prince considered Pridi to be "very sincere," "patriotic," and "a man of worth," and suspected him to be
the leader of the Thai underground, for, Subha Svasti argued, "he is intensely anti-Japanese and [anti-Phibun's]
administration up to a point that a man of his character cannot sit still and let the affairs go by without attempting
anything." The prince further added that if he was right, if the underground was in fact led by Pridi, then the Thai
liberation movement "will have a fair chance of success," and insisted to the British authorities that Pridi "is a man
whom we must contact."[58] Therefore, had it not been for the unrelenting suspicion among liberation movement
members against Thai royals, Prince Subha Svasti would have been the perfect candidate to lead the Free Siamese
movement.[59]
Unfortunately, Subha Svasti had always been seen as a die-hard monarchist, and it made his motives questionable
to his countrymen. The prince was a part of the old monarchical regime that was overthrown by the men of the
ruling elite, which consisted of powerful political figures like Pridi and Phibun. He was also the brother-in-law, as
well as one of the closest and most loyal advisors of King Prajadhipok, the last absolute monarch of Thailand. What
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is more, he was the son of Prince Svasti who, according to Sir Crosby, was "the most unpopular of all the Princes
with the men who came into power.... after the coup d'etat." [60] Due to these reasons, many members of the
FSM opposed the prince's leadership, for they believed that he had the agenda to revert Thailand back to the old
feudal ways. Others, who saw him in a better light, rejected him because they feared, and as the attitude of the
Thais in Chungking suggests rightly so, that the Free Siamese movement would be misconstrued as a political
movement to restore absolutist rule in Thailand.[61]
Throughout the war, Subha Svasti tried determinedly but fruitlessly to convince fellow Thai patriots in the
liberation movement that he had no political ambition or personal agenda. He repeatedly swore that his only
motives were "national liberation and to see democracy truly prosper in Thailand.[62] The prince even went by a
different name, 'Arun', in order to hide the fact that he was a prince. He told his British superiors that he "has no
politics and does not want to appear as a monarchist."[63] Furthermore, although the SOE highly valued the
prince's knowledge and admired his dedication, the Foreign Office never supported him or recognized him as the
leader of the FSM. This was because the British government wanted to assert its influence on the Thais, both then
and after the war, and backing someone who was as unpopular among his countrymen as Subha Svasti would
frustrate this goal rather than promote it. Hence the suspicion of the Thais in Chungking that the British were
backing a Thai royalist restoration was entirely unfounded.[64] And the prince became the victim, a perfect
example of how the sociopolitical structure in Thailand shaped what went on in this movement to restore national
sovereignty. [65] Ironically, Subha Svasti, probably the least appreciated and the most suspected member of the
entire Thai liberation effort, was also most likely the least political of them all.
In the second half of 1943, Captain Miles of the United States Navy Intelligence was becoming more and more
entangled in Thai politics. He saw that the establishment of a Thai exile government in Chungking equaled a Free
Thai and OSS success under his supervision, as well as a strong cooperative relationship between the Chinese and
the Americans as the product of his maneuvering. And Miles believed that achieving the aforementioned would
substantially boost the esteem in which he was held by his superiors. As a result, he pushed to speed up the
organization of a Free Thai base in China. Miles promoted the idea of a Thai government in Chungking to the Thais
under his care and sought to eliminate the possibility that the said government would be set up elsewhere.
Together with the Chinese, Miles had also rejected the British attempt to contact Balankura or cooperate with the
American Free Thai group. Furthermore, he made use of the Free Thais' mistrust towards Prince Subha Svasti and
the FSM to achieve further distance from the SOE. He reinforced their fear of absolute rule and advised the Free
Thais against cooperating with the Free Siamese, implying that the latter were deeply under the "influence" of the
British and were involved in "party politics" to support the royalist revival, and that was why they chose Prince
Subha Svasti to be the leader of their group. [66] It did not seem to matter to Miles that none of this was true; he
was determined to alienate anyone who opposed or threatened the establishment of the Chinese-centric Free Thai
base and government.
At the same time, Miles encouraged unity between the NLM delegates and the American Free Thai unit in
Chungking, all of whom now seemed to be in favor of forming the Thai exile government in Nationlist China. He
told the Thais, "there must a single organization which is pulling together without any inharmonious power seeking
individuals," and that their "differences must be settled after the war ... for war waits for nobody."[67] Miles
ultimately threatened, "no recognition or action would be accorded to a Free Thai Government so long as there
was more than one group in the organization competing for power."[68] In addition, he pushed for a decision to be
made among the Thais in China, and in doing so, he encouraged political involvement of the Free Thai officers
despite the fact that he himself had reassured Pramoj and the OSS many times that he understood that the duties
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of the Free Thai agents, including Kunjara, were strictly military, and that they had no authority to make political
decisions.
The tangled situation in China demonstrates that the Free Thai effort was stalled by division and uncertainty: the
rivalry between the American military agencies and the British SOE, the Chinese agenda to take over the
movement, and Miles' troublesome meddling. Moreover, the Free Thai movement made little progress with
regard to cooperating with the NLM because the United States government was unwilling to fight for the custody
of the delegates from Thailand at the expense of its relationship with Chiang Kai Shek's regime. But their
reluctance was understandable, for while the Allies' efforts determined the fate of the FTM and of Thailand, they
were, in turn, shaped not just by inter-Allied politics, but also by their interests in Thailand, as well as their
perceptions of Thai politics. The United States authorities were unsure of the effectiveness of the Thai resistance,
and the internal conflicts among the members only served to discourage their effort. It was only natural that the
Americans were hesitant to take the FTM seriously, when even the Thais could not seem to reach any agreement
among themselves. Prince Subha Svasti reflected in his memoir on the challenges facing the FSM. He wrote, "it was
the Thais ourselves who disrupted the smooth sailing of our operation. The British merely ... exploited our disunity
to suit their goals."[69] The debacle in China proved that this was true not only in the case of the FSM in Britain,
but for the FTM as well.
In September 1943, Kunjara reported to the Thai Legation, "I have made certain that the Thai people [who] came
out from Thailand are sincere. They have full co-operation of the Chinese authority. All our boys are confident in
co-operating with them."[70] This deeply upset Pramoj, who then protested to the OSS that they had not kept
their promise that Kunjara would be kept "under close surveillance, practically as if he were a prisoner,"[71] but
instead the colonel, who was the least reliable person of all in the eyes of the minister, "was unwisely allowed to
interrogate the members of [the] political delegation [from Thailand] and pass judgment on their political
trustworthiness."[72] Pramoj told the OSS and Miles that he feared the delegates from Thailand would mistakenly
"think Kunjara represents Thai movement in America. Whereas ... it has been repeatedly stated that Kunjara is not
a political agent and should not be considered as one." Thus, the minister asked Miles to "advise [the] Thai groups
as to [the] 'status' of Kunjara," and insisted that Balankura and Tularak be sent to Washington as soon as
possible.[73] Unfortunately, Pramoj's requests fell on deaf ears; not only was Miles the person who promoted
politics among the Thais in the first place, he and Tai Li also advocated a scheme to form a mighty Free Thai army
to be made up of the Free Thai officers from America and Thai-born Chinese, who would be trained under Miles
and Tai Li's supervision. This Sino-Thai army, as the SACO chiefs planned, was to invade from Southern China and
drive out the Japanese military forces occupying Thailand.
This grand scheme, which entailed an extensive collaboration between the Chinese and the Thais, caused relations
between Pramoj and Kunjara to plummet even further because it appeared to the former that the latter had much
to benefit from all these China-based plans. On the one hand, Kunjara had been appeasing Pramoj, ensuring him
th
that he would stick to his military duties and not interfere with politics. On September 24 , he wrote to the
minister, "The boys and I are not anxious to be mixed up in politics unless absolutely forced upon us. Unity of Thai
group is most essential to be able to liberate our country."[74] In another telegram, Kunjara further reassured
Pramoj of his position: "I made it clear I am not a political representative and can only discuss fighting.... I will be in
position only to execute the operation when it has been decided by you what we agree to do."[75] On the other
hand, sneaking behind Pramoj's back, Kunjara put himself forth as a candidate to lead the new Chinese-sponsored
core of the liberation movement by reporting to the Americans that Tularak had expressed his wish that he
(Kunjara) be "the head of the Free Thai Fighting Forces," a.k.a. the proposed Sino-Thai army.[76] To make matters
even more complicated, Miles also wrote to General William J. Donovan, head of the OSS, promoting the China
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scheme. Miles argued, "Kunjara and Balankura are each in full accord with [the] policies of Tularaksa [who] wants
us [to] set up [a] Free Thai government in exile in Chungking ... and Free Thai troops in Southern China." The
captain then recommended that "Kunjara be adequately promoted and given command of it [the Sino-Thai army]
and also retain control of his present officers."[77] This means that had the Sino-Thai scheme turned out according
to SACO's plan, Kunjara would have become the most important and most powerful person in the entire
resistance.
All this time, Miles was probably unaware that the United States State Department had no intention to recognize a
Free Thai government, and neither was it the intention of the OSS to create a Sino-Thai army. Hence, Miles' effort
only caused increasing dissention among the Thais, while it did not benefit him personally at all. In fact, Miles
landed himself in hot water because he meddled too much in the Free Thai business while failing to fulfill his other
obligations to his superiors as the American chief of SACO. General Joseph Stilwell, who was in charge of the ChinaBurma-India Theater of the war, had been much displeased with Miles' work, or rather lack of work in China. As
early as July 1943, Lt. Col. Richard P. Heppner reported to the OSS headquarters in Washington about Miles'
incompetence. He wrote, "General [Stilwell] is thoroughly fed up with [Miles] who has and is producing
nothing."[78]
However, for Pramoj, who could not be sure what exactly was going on within the inner circle of the US military
command, the rumors he had heard from China and the idea of a massive Sino-Thai collaboration and an exile
government in Chungking deeply troubled him. He informed Secretary of State Hull that he thought it was
"unnecessary and unwise to establish a Thai Government-in-Exile anywhere."[79] In fact, Pramoj had wanted to
set up an exile government, as he proposed to Phibun before the Japanese invasion, but one in Washington, not in
China and definitely not under the maneuvers of the Chinese. Setting up a government in exile was also an
extremely delicate matter that needed the approval and support of the United States, not to mention that the said
government must be led by suitable people who had the support of the population back home. Pramoj most likely
told Hull that he did not support "any" Thai government in exile to appease the State Department, which had not
signed off on the idea. Pramoj feared, above all, that he and ergo the Free Thai movement, would lose the support
of State Department officials, and thus tried ensure them that the Thai Legation had not gone behind their backs
and carried out a plan that they had not approved.
Furthermore, Pramoj strongly opposed sending the Sino-Thai army into Thailand. The minister obviously did not
want Kunjara to become any more powerful. But, more importantly, he feared, as he wrote in his postwar memoir,
that the Chinese might "come into Thailand and try to assert their influence in the country after the war."[80]
Accordingly, the minister firmly declared, "whenever Col. Kunjara leads the Sino-Thai troops into Thailand, that will
be the day I dismiss him from his post."[81] What is more, the minister reemphasized that the colonel could not be
trusted. He warned that if and when Kunjara reentered Thailand, he might "give the names of resistance members
in Thailand to the Japanese."[82] However, Pramoj's protests seemed to have very little impact on what was going
on out of his reach in Chungking.
It became Pramoj's worst fear that the movement which he had started was slipping out of his control, as Tularak
and Kunjara, with Miles and Tai Li, continued to make important plans in Chungking without his consent. As long as
the Thai delegates were detained in Chungking, Pramoj was kept out of the position to veto any plans made or
endorsed by Kunjara or the Chinese. What is worse, in Washington, Pramoj had also been outvoted by Kunjara and
the students-turned-officers in the Free Thai Committee,[83] even though in the minister's view, the committee
had been created to settle internal matters only and should not have any power over the Thai Legation. In early
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October, the sudden death of Balankura, Pramoj's only ally in China, supposedly of stomach cancer, finally pushed
the Thai minister over the edge.
Pramoj lashed out in a series of accusations against Kunjara. He suspected that the colonel was involved in the
mysterious death of Balankura, "who had previously condemned Lt. Col. Kunjara as a spy and an enemy of the Free
Thai movement," and who had wanted to establish a Thai government in British India, and "was about to leave
China on his way to see me in Washington."[84] He also accused Kunjara of having a hidden agenda that could be
detrimental to the Free Thai movement and the Allied cause and reminded the American officials that the colonel
had been proven guilty of swindling funds from the movement. Pramoj believed that Kunjara was an extremely
ambitious man. He argued, "Kunjara [who] had concluded that post-war Thailand should be run by Free Thais,"
rather than by the people's elected government, "had his lines out for future politics [and] since he has been away
he has been playing those lines."[85] Even "the soldiers of the Free Thai unit in China," Pramoj continued, "have
been encouraged to play a part in politics through the intrigues carried on by Lt. Col. Kunjara."[86] The minister
further alleged that Kunjara, in collaboration with the Chinese, had pressured Balankura and Tularak to agree to a
Thai exile government in Chungking. He related to Major Carl Hoffman, Director of OSS Far Eastern operations,
that "the purpose of the delegation ... was to set up a Thai government-in-exile in India. It was after Lt. Col.
Kunjara's contact with its members that the original purpose ... was transformed into a proposal to establish a
government-in-exile in China."[87] Finally, Pramoj demanded that the colonel be "recalled to be discharged and
relieved of all his duties and functions in connection with the Free Thai movement."[88]
Political and diplomatic advisers in the OSS, who had extensive knowledge of Thailand's political situation and
were aware of Kunjara's tarnished reputation, agreed with Pramoj. Frederic Dolbeare, a foreign affairs adviser to
Thailand before the war, alleged that Kunjara had been connected to a scandal involving illegal military contracts
before the war. He, like Pramoj, also believed that Kunjara was involved in Balankura's death. Dolbeare found a
natural cause of death hard to believe, stating, "I cannot escape feeling that this was a very rapid development of a
fatal cancerous growth for a young man, who, I understand to have not been over thirty years of age."[89] He
added, "Kunjara has a doubtful record and a big stake in hand," and "Balankura was a potential threat to Kunjara's
ambition and died suddenly."[90] Dolbeare concluded that Kunjara would not be "viewed with confidence by the
men in Siam with whom we wish to deal," and warned that the colonel was "a potential threat to anyone sent
there [to Thailand] who does not fit in with his schemes," as well as "a threat to the safety of the decent elements
who are inside the country."[91] Herman Scholtz of the OSS Secret Intelligence branch pointed out similarly that as
Kunjara's past record was "well known to the Thais," the Free Thai movement with his name as a leader would
prompt the anti-Japanese elements in Thailand to "react unfavorably and support within the country [would] be
lacking."[92] Scholtz was, on the other hand, very sympathetic towards Pramoj. He wrote to his superior, Milton
Katz: "the Thai Minister who after the decision of the Thai Premier to cooperate with Japan, broke with his
government and declared himself a Free Thai should have a voice in any decisions regarding the Free Thai
Movement."[93]
On the contrary, a number of OSS military commanders viewed Kunjara in a much more positive light. On October
st
21 , Hoffman responded to Pramoj's accusations against the Thai colonel, all of which he deemed "unfounded."
On the subject of Kunjara's misappropriation of funds, Hoffman claimed "no 'guilt' as appears from the
documents."[94] He further pointed out that these "facts" about Kunjara had not been brought to the attention of
the OSS from the start of the operation, and thus the minister, he assumed, must have "considered them of
insufficient bearing on [Kunjara's] military qualifications, otherwise," Hoffman told Pramoj, "you would not have
consented in the first instance to having Colonel Kunjara head up the project."[95] In his argument, Hoffman was,
of course, implying that Pramoj had made up all these accusations because of jealousy and insecurity that Kunjara
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was gaining more influence and popularity in the Free Thai movement. Hoffman also clarified that the OSS had
never promised to watch Kunjara "as though he were a prisoner."[96] They merely promised, Hoffman argued, to
keep the colonel under close observation until his trustworthiness had been established. And according to the
reports he received from OSS agents in China, Kunjara was "fit" as a Free Thai commander and the morale of his
group was excellent. Hoffman argued that there was no report of Kunjara exercising his influence on the Thai
personnel whatsoever.[97] He then said sarcastically to Pramoj: "It is unfortunate if the political differences of
opinion between you and the Colonel have grown since ... However, it is beyond the scope of this organization [the
OSS] to become involved in politics."[98] Hoffman, in the end, declined the minister's request to have Kunjara
removed from the movement.
General Donovan, on the other hand, was less clear about where he stood on the matter of Kunjara's reliability.
However, by the fall of 1943, he had become very much fed up with Pramoj's complaints, which he deemed
disruptive to his work. Pramoj recalled in his memoir that he was called in to the general's office one morning,
when the latter angrily "banged on his desk and yelled at me, warning me to stop interfering with the American
war effort."[99] Donovan and his military commanders in the OSS would come to realize almost a year later that
Pramoj was right about Kunjara being troublesome. But unfortunately, for the time being, Pramoj failed to get rid
of Kunjara, for not all of the OSS officials agreed with him that the colonel's untrustworthiness and threat to the
Thai movement and to the Americans' goals outweighed his usefulness in the field.
In his assessment of Kunjara, Dolbeare pointed out an interesting fact that turned out to be a critical problem in
the Free Thai movement; he wrote, "If these suspicions [about Kunjara] are all completely unfounded, then they
ought to be cleared up because no one who shares them can [work with him] with any peace of mind."[100] The
American officials failed to make a decision whether to completely trust Kunjara, or dismiss him from his duty. This
caused much delay and many complications in the China mission. At the same time, Pramoj refused to accept any
proposal that came out of China, suspecting that Kunjara was behind it. Miles, on the other hand, saw that the
colonel's attitude fit with his plans and continued to back him, giving him more power than the OSS would care for
him to have. In turn, Kunjara, confident that his position was safeguarded by the Americans, continued to make
plans with the Chinese and Miles to promote a scheme that in the end went nowhere. All in all the Free Thai
movement was caught in a vicious cycle of distrust and indecisiveness; it was stuck in limbo.
Was there any truth to Pramoj's accusations against Kunjara? Or was it all made up because of one man's jealousy
of the other? Despite what Pramoj and Dolbeare may have believed, it is very unlikely that Kunjara was involved in
Balankura's death. Kunjara met Balankura for the first time in mid-September 1943, less than a month before the
latter's death, and, according to Colonel L.T. Ride, a British officer who came into possession of his diary, Balankura
nd
had begun to feel pain in his stomach as early as May 2 .[101] Nevertheless, it would be naïve to suggest that
Kunjara was innocent of all charges the Thai minister laid against him. Documents consulted in this study have
shown that Kunjara was making extensive plans with Miles and Tai Li without the approval, and sometimes
without the knowledge of Pramoj, the State Department, or the OSS--although Pramoj seemed to be the only one
aware of the fact at this point (mid-1943). Moreover, the colonel's behavior while in active duty rendered him to
be a rather questionable leader.
While the Free Thai officers often favored Kunjara over Pramoj, they knew well that he was far from a perfect
leader and even pointed out the colonel's lack of responsibility. Though it is uncertain whether or not Kunjara was
guilty of the charge of illegal use of Free Thai funds, the colonel did have a bad spending habit and often seemed to
be running into money problems. During the mission in China, he frequently borrowed from others. On October
18, 1943, he wrote to Nicol Smith, who was at the time in India procuring currency and equipment for the group's
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operation in China and Thailand, "there had been quite a lot of expenses incurred around Chungking, especially for
me." Kunjara then asked Smith, "if you have some American money in hand, I wish you would try and change them
into Chinese money;" he requested 2,000,000 in Chinese currency, which he said would only last him six
months.[102] The colonel had also been borrowing from a certain "skipper" a.k.a. Captain Miles. He confessed to
Smith that "so far I have borrowed CNS 300,000 off of him."[103] Kunjara tried to convince Smith that he needed
all that money for operational purposes. In spite of that, the latter, who was well aware of what and how much
was required for the mission to succeed, questioned, "why he is having such heavy expenditure."[104]
In addition, Kunjara's absence from the Free Thai quarters began to agitate those under his command. According
to Chok na Ranong, the Free Thai officers were billeted in "an ancient Chinese house, about 1.5 km away from the
American quarters." The place was under the care of the Chinese secret service. Kunjara, on the other hand,
decided to stay by himself "in a rented house in Chungking, which was not provided by the Chinese."[105] The
colonel also had several mistresses in the city. It was probably his private house and mistresses that accounted for
his ridiculous spending. In fact, Reynolds noted in his book that one of Smith's tasks in India was procuring
cosmetics for Kunjara's mistress.[106] The colonel's lifestyle caused more problems as the Thai officers started to
feel that his constant absence was hindering their operation. Chok complained that he saw Kunjara "only once in a
great while. Some weeks he didn't come at all."[107] OSS agents stationed near the Free Thai living quarters also
began to take note of the colonel's irresponsibility. Chok wrote in his memoir, "whenever the OSS send someone
to contact us, our C.O. was never there. The OSS was so fed up that finally they asked: 'where's your f******
C.O.!?'"[108] Besides that, Chok related, communication was difficult enough with the OSS without Kunjara being
away all the time, and the security measures in China were far from 'secure,' especially since the colonel's
"girlfriend" had turned out to be "a Japanese spy and had already been executed by a firing squad."[109]
But despite Kunjara's unfitting behavior, the Free Thai officers still felt closer ties to him than to Pramoj. This could
be explained by the officers' sense of camaraderie; at least Kunjara, more or less, was making the same sacrifices
and sharing the same hardship they were. Therefore, the officers were much more sympathetic towards him.
Chintana Yossunthorn, a civilian member of the FTM who published numerous articles about the movement in a
Thai magazine after the war, even dismissed Kunjara's drinking and adultery simply as a common practice among
wartime military men. She wrote, "For a typical soldier, alcohol, women, and warfare are the things that go
together."[110] Yossunthorn, more than others, admired Kunjara as the "hero" of the Free Thai movement, a man
who was "decisive, a brave man, and a gentleman in every way."[111]
From the above, we can see that Kunjara, albeit being a most irresponsible leader, was probably not the evil
mastermind Pramoj had made him out to be. Rather, he was the slippery kind, an opportunist who went with the
flow. Kunjara genuinely wanted to regain Thailand's independence--even his inappropriate involvement in the
scheme for the Sino-Thai cooperation has shown that much--but he certainly did not shy away from reaping the
benefits when the opportunity presented itself. In addition, Kunjara did try to blacken the name of the man who
had been so hostile toward him from the beginning and, at the same time, eliminate the competition. As his
telegrams to Pramoj in the fall of 1943 have demonstrated, the colonel pretended to play nice, deferring to the
minister's authority and ensuring him that he understood his role was strictly military. But in the meantime, in
Chungking, Kunjara also tried to maintain in his own grasp, as well as in his allies', Miles and Tai Li, what he thought
was the crucial decision-making for the Thai liberation movement. When Kunjara met Tularak in September, he
implied that the course of the Free Thai Movement should be decided in Chungking because the Chinese,
according to the colonel, "preferred to exclude [Pramoj] since he is very difficult to handle."[112]
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Furthermore, in a rather subtle way, Kunjara tried to worsen the views of the Free Thai officers towards Pramoj,
and he succeeded; a great number of Free Thai officers blamed Pramoj for the setbacks in their cause. Chok na
Ranong was one of them. He probably did not realize that Kunjara exaggerated when he wrote the following in his
postwar memorandum: "M.L. Kharb [Kunjara] told us these people [Tularak and company] wished to go to
Washington, as Balankura had wanted but that they had been turned down by M.R. Seni [Pramoj], who did not
want to pay for their transportation. That was why they were stuck in Chungking without any prospects of
completing their mission."[113] Kunjara cleverly took advantage of the fact that the Free Thai students had
previously been embittered by Pramoj's refusal to authorize them reasonable pay. Throughout the movement,
Pramoj tried to limit how much the members of the resistance spent and were paid, for the fear that they would
be seen by the Americans, their key sponsor, as mercenaries. But Pramoj's tight grip on the FTM's treasury led
Chok and the other students to believe that, just as in their case, the minister refused to help the Thai delegates
because he was cheap and wanted to keep all the money to himself.
Despite how thrifty Pramoj was, he did not refuse to pay for the delegates' travels; in fact, that they were stuck in
China had nothing to do with money. Pramoj wrote numerous letters complaining about Tularak's delayed trip and
requesting the United States government's help to expedite the matter. Furthermore, the minister was anxious to
th
get the Thai delegates out of China, away from the influences of Kunjara and the Chinese. On September 17 ,
immediately after Tularak reached Chungking, Pramoj expressed to Miles via Halliwell that he desired to have
Tularak and Balankura arrive in Washington as soon as possible.[114] At the same time, he also asked Luang
Dithakarn Bhakdi, one of his subordinates at the Thai Legation, to request the American authorities in Washington
to help facilitate the delegates' travels. Bhakdi wrote to an OSS officer, "we should be extremely grateful if his
[Tularak's] departure from China ... could be accelerated through your kind intervention."[115] In addition, in late
November, Pramoj wrote to Mani Sanasen, his representative in London, complaining that despite the fact that
"authorities here are doing everything possible to get them [the delegates] out of China, [their departure] has
been delayed at the other end."[116]
But in spite of what has been revealed by declassified documents, many Free Thai officers believed then and
continued to do so long after the war that Balankura failed and Tularak was delayed because of Pramoj. Decades
after the war, when Chok wrote his memorandum, he was still convinced that Tularak and company were able to
go to Washington only because he and the Free Thai officers in Chungking had offered to pay for their trip.
Chintana Yossunthorn believed that Pramoj refused to help Balankura and Tularak because he "had resented Pridi
Banomyong for a long time ... and thus refused to cooperate with Pridi's liberation party."[117] Sawat Sisuk, an
officer in the FSM, thought similarly. He wrote in his book, which was a commentary on Balankura's diary, that
Balankura could not go to Washington because Pramoj did not want him there; the United States government
merely followed the minister's wish.[118]
Pramoj's inept diplomacy and clumsy leadership played right into Kunjara's hand. Instead of trying to patch things
between himself and the Free Thai officers in order to sway them from Kunjara's influence, he accused them of
being "[the colonel's] satellites" and behaving like "mercenaries, hired soldiers trying to make money out of this
war."[119] What is more, he alleged that they were "setting up a committee [in Chungking] illegally" to decide by
themselves matters of the movement and Thailand's political future.[120] The students felt deeply betrayed. They
volunteered for this great cause, knowing full well the risks, without expecting anything in return. They certainly
did not deserve to be accused of trying to benefit from this great and noble cause which was as much their own as
th
it was Pramoj's. Chok's letter to Bunmag Desabutra, dated October 30 , revealed that he was hurt and found it
hard to believe that Pramoj, a man who was "smart and has a moral code [would] play such a dirty trick as to say
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nasty things about us when we are not there."[121] Moreover, he was angry; Pramoj had no right to judge the
men in China when he was "sitting behind a desk [and] sleeping in a comfortable bed [while] we have left all
comfort behind us, all the love ones, we are doing to real sacrifice."[122] A few months later, Chok wrote a bitter
letter to Pramoj, reiterating that the minister was wrong to accuse the men:
"We could have pushed on with our studies with the prewar pay and could still have
our automobiles. We could have worked in the States and get as much pay as we
are getting now if not more. We could easily out-live the war and spend our
vacations in nice places as you do now ... But we gave all that up by our own free
will."[123]
The other officers in Chungking as well as back in Washington were equally upset by Pramoj's attack. Bundit
Kantabutra called it "nothing less than a foul play."[124] Pao Khamurai, who was also in China at the time, was so
angry that he called Pramoj a "son of a b****."[125]
By attacking the Free Thai officers, Pramoj was not only being vicious and petty, he was also being incredibly
stupid. Even Chok, who was just a college student at the time, understood that "it is 'impolitic' to make us his
enemies."[126] Within less than two years, Pramoj had managed to go from being a hero to a self-isolated,
unwanted dictator; Kunjara hardly had to lift a finger. By early 1944, Chok had come to compare Pramoj to the
"Führer," indisputably the most hated man in World War II.[127] What is more, the officers suspected that the
minister was eyeing political power after the war, despite the fact that he had repeatedly stated, "I disclaimed all
political ambitions in postwar Thailand."[128] The students' skepticism was not completely unfounded for Pramoj
exhibited certain dictator-like behavior. When he made the accusations against Kunjara and the students, Pramoj
demanded that they be kept secret from the accused. However, the news was leaked by someone in Washington
who was in regular contact with the men in China. The minister, hell bent on finding the culprit, called Kunjara's
wife "on the carpet" and interrogated her.[129] Furthermore, in October 1943, after learning that Kunjara and the
Free Thai officers in Chungking had been making political plans with Tularak and after being repeatedly overruled
in the FTC, Pramoj told the OSS he wished to be directly involved "in censorship of personal correspondence to the
Thais in the field from those in this country [United States]." The minister argued, "that was the way to keep the
minds of the Thais on fighting rather than on politics and factions."[130]
Pramoj's actions suggest that he had gone completely overboard in his handling of this volunteer-based
movement. Still, they seemed more like the symptoms of an extremely nervous and politically paranoid leader-whose paranoia increased the more he cared about the movement--rather than a politically ambitious one. Pramoj
was by no means an idiot; he did almost single-handedly win the support of the United States government. Had he
wanted power in postwar Thailand, like Chok said, he would have known better not to offend potential allies and
supporters. Pramoj's mistakes stemmed partially from his arrogance and the fact that he viewed himself as the
Thai minister and the Free Thai officers as merely students. He was also extremely uptight, scared that if he did not
take complete control of the movement something was going to go wrong and he would be held responsible. In
addition, Pramoj was in constant fear that the world would view the Free Thai movement as a profiteering
organization, and that would discourage their support, as well as jeopardize the chance of Thailand regaining its
sovereign status after the war. This was a major factor why he was so cautious about the money the organization
spent and worried about the students meddling in politics. Although Pramoj personally had quite surpassed a mild
case of paranoia, the fear of negative public opinion, especially of the Allied countries, was not uncommon among
Thai liberation fighters during World War II. It was, as has been demonstrated earlier, the very reason why the
members of the Free Siamese movement rejected Prince Subha Svasti.
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According to the wartime documents, it is very unlikely that Pramoj was using the Free Thai movement to benefit
his future political career. First of all, Pramoj knew he was no politician and that he, at the time, did not stand a
chance against his competition in Bangkok, be it the current premier Phibun or Pridi Banomyong, who had been
known to the people back home as the father of Thai democracy. This was not to say that Pramoj had no ambition
at all, for he did become Thailand's Prime Minister after the war.[131] Nonetheless, it did not seem that Pramoj's
wartime decisions were calculated moves that he made in order to get to the top of the Thai political ladder. It
does seem, however, that the power Pramoj enjoyed as the leader of the FTM, coupled with his over-cautious
character, not to mention his desperation to gain and maintain the support of the United States government for
the security of Thailand's postwar autonomy, caused him to become increasingly controlling.
The conflict between Pramoj and the Free Thai officers ultimately resulted in Pramoj's resignation from the FTC.
Pramoj subsequently wrote a letter to the Free Thai officers, reprimanding them for "negotiating for the
establishment of a Thai Government in exile [and thus] acted against our previous understanding." He also
maintained, "I am not responsible for the present regrettable impairment of your military efficiency and
morale."[132] Furthermore, the minister reminded the officers of his status: "the United States Government will
not recognize [the FTC], but will deal only with me, who, by accident of position, happen to be the only legal
representative of the Thai nation accredited to this country."[133] Pramoj's belief about his diplomatic position,
not his political ambition, explains his need to control everything that went on in the movement. Though he had
good intentions, Pramoj went about ensuring that the FTM stayed on the right course poorly. It suggests, as
Tularak described, that Pramoj was "a true Thai, patriotic," but unfortunately was "not experienced as a diplomat
and not a good politician."[134] In that respect, Pramoj's shortcomings cost the movement.
All through 1943, the Free Thai mission was delayed by mutual mistrust and petty quarrels between the key
players. The members of the resistance could not dispel the suspicion that certain individuals among their
comrades had ulterior political motives. It is both ironic and tragic that despite the fact that they had all sworn
equally strongly that they would not seek personal gains from their involvement in the liberation movement, all
were still preoccupied with their distrust of one another. Failing to create mutual trust, the Free Thai work could
not move forward.
What made matters worse was the fact that the Free Thai operation and the OSS ventures in China remained
under the control of Miles' and Tai Li's SACO. As the delegates from Thailand continued to be detained in
Chungking, and as the Free Thais agents were further delayed from executing their mission, it became increasing
clear to the OSS and the Thais that the Nationalist Chinese were seeking to exploit the Thai resistance movement
for their own postwar goals. One indication of this was the Sino-Thai army. According to Reynolds, "attaching SinoThai agents to the OSS Free Thai teams" would not only allow the Chinese to "keep tabs on the activities of the USbacked group," but the Chinese also wished to make use of the "social standing and Bangkok connections of the
Free Thai officers from America," in order to establish a foothold in the country in preparation for China's postwar
dominance over Southeast Asia, just as Pramoj feared.[135] As time progressed, the Chinese ulterior motive
became more apparent to the Free Thai officers operating in China. The Chinese seemed to be more
uncooperative than they were willing to really help. Pow Khamurai made the following comment about the
Chinese cooperation in a 1986 interview:
Moderate accommodation was provided for us by the Chinese secret police, but
they permitted us no access to information on Thailand. It seemed that we were
barred from doing any task that would gain credit for our country.[136]
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Khamurai understood, however, that the Chinese were not the only obstacle preventing the progress of the Free
Thai movement. He reflected, "We wasted our time staying at Chungking for eight months because of the state of
uncertainty of Sino-Thai politics and also that among the Thais ourselves."[137] Khamurai further expressed his
regret in getting involved in the politics in the movement: "I developed a hatred for politics and do not want to
meddle in politics. Once you enter politics you cannot stay away from dirt!"[138]
Chok na Ranong, who had previously held Pramoj responsible for the movement's delays, including the Tularak's
trip to Washington and the fact that Balankura never made it out of China, reflected later that it was more "the
Chinese policy that kept them there."[139] Chok also observed that initially, Kunjara "hit it off very well" with the
head of Chinese secret police, Tai Li. He described that when Tai Li and Kunjara were first introduced to one
another by Miles at a party, the captain hosted for the two, "it was love at first sight."[140] He further recalled that
Tai Li "invited Kunjara to the endless games of 'bottoms up' and even took off his Rolex Oyster and presented it to
the Thai colonel in front of all the guests at the party."[141] Tai Li then promised to help Kunjara make contact
with the likely anti-Japanese military elements in northeastern Thailand. Chok wrote, "[Kunjara] believed him but
nothing materialized after that conversation."[142]
Later on, Chok left Chungking to carry on the plan to infiltrate Thailand. During this time, he developed a very
hostile attitude towards the Chinese because he believed that he had uncovered the Chinese plan to betray the
Free Thai movement and exploit Thailand after the war. The Sino-Thais were less than friendly to the Free Thai
agents they were attached to. According to Chok, the Chinese commanders, who had been assigned by Tai Li to
accompany the Free Thai agents through Southern China, instructed their Thai-born subordinates not to speak Thai
with them. Chok also started to notice that the Chinese made up various excuses to delay their journey to
Thailand. The Free Thai officer found out that Japanese soldiers had somehow learned about their projected path
to Thailand and were waiting to intercept his party. Luckily, Chok came down with stomach flu and his group's
journey was delayed. It made him realize, however, "I had been deceived and almost killed by a Japanese agent, I
had to be more careful and try to find out the motive" of the Chinese.[143] Chok eventually found out, by getting a
Chinese lieutenant drunk, that they had been trying to sabotage the Free Thai operation all along. He recalled that
the intoxicated lieutenant confessed that he had been ordered by a general who was a close subordinate of Tai Li
"to prevent the Free Thai officers from infiltrating Thailand and, if they could not be stopped, to let the Japanese
know so that they would be duly taken care of."[144] Chok believed that he had uncovered a conspiracy by two of
the Allied powers that the Thais depended upon to win back their independence. He wrote,
China and England had been coordinating a plan to divide Thailand after the war. China
would disarm the Japanese in the north and northeast region while England would disarm
the Japanese from the central region southward. If the Free Thai movement was allowed
to operate successfully, the agreement with England would become void.[145]
Chok certainly presented an interesting theory, one that was quite possible and, in fact, made a lot of sense.
However, no further concrete evidence could solidify his claim, and Chok's argument remained only a conspiracy
theory.
Nonetheless, the Chinese half-hearted effort to cooperate with the Free Thais and the OSS did not go unnoticed by
the Americans. In fact, the Army, OSS and State Department echelons held Captain Miles responsible for this. Miles
was the only United States official in China who had a close relationship with Tai Li, but he failed to use his
influence on the general to the benefit of United States interests. Miles' possessiveness of the Free Thai movement
and the American ventures in China in general landed him at odds with his superiors. In a report to Donovan, an
OSS officer named John Davies criticized Miles for getting involved in Thai politics. He wrote, "Miles proposed to
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play a triangular game: Balankura, the Thai Military Attache (heading the OSS group) and the Vice President
[Sanguan Tularak]. Miles seemingly intended to set up his own Free Thai movement without reference to the
Embassy [the Thai Legation] or the State Department."[146] In September 1943, Miles was warned by G. Edward
Buxton, Donovan's aide, to steer clear from making unapproved promises to the Thais or the Chinese on behalf of
the United States government. Buxton stressed that "recognition of governments-in-exile ... and Lend Lease were
beyond the province of the OSS." He ordered Miles to "avoid further discussion of such matters, adding that the
State Department would make the final decision."[147] In spite of this, not much changed in terms of the Sino-Thai
scheme, and the plan to build a Sino-Thai army moved forward.
Finally, in December, Donovan decided to come down to Chungking himself to deal with Miles and Tai Li, and set a
new course for OSS operations in the Far East, including those in conjunction with the FTM. Donovan fired Miles
for incompetence and ordered a stop to be put to the far-fetched Sino-Thai army scheme. He wrote to Carl
Hoffman,
I had no idea that Miles had gone to such lengths in commitments before consulting
us. This you will stop at once. The whole conception [Sino-Thai army] is cock-eyed
even if it were not beyond our directive ... I entirely disapprove the larger scheme
[which is] politically and militarily unsound, logistically impossible and economically
stupid.[148]
The OSS's problems in China, however, were not solved by getting rid of Miles alone. In fact, the relationship
between the OSS and Tai Li had taken a turn for the worse. Donovan himself could not seem to get along with the
Chinese general.[149] He, thus, decided that the command of the OSS and the Free Thai operation were to be
moved to India once the team in China had successfully infiltrated Thailand. Donovan, in fact, had been building
cooperative working relationship with Lord Louis Mountbatten of Burma, who, as agreed by Donovan, "would
retain full operational control over a new OSS unit in his theater, but the latter ... would not be integrated with nor
placed under the command of any purely British unit."[150]
Kunjara, on the other hand, remained in China until late summer of 1944, when his OSS superiors finally realized
how deeply involved he was with the Chinese and the Sino-Thai scheme. Even after Miles' expulsion, Kunjara was
still heavily involved in the Sino-Thai plans. In 1944, British intelligence apparently intercepted "letters from
Kunjara to the Chinese offering to lead a pro-Chinese Free Thai Group at Chungking."[151] In September that year,
Col. John Coughlin, who had replaced Miles as commander of the OSS unit in China, finally wrote to Donovan: "I
doubt that [Kunjara] can be trusted.... I feel he will make deals with Tai Li of which I will not be informed."[152]
Subsequently, the Sino-Thai scheme was shut down and Kunjara was called back to Washington. Although the
complete takeover of Free Thai military operations by the OSS in early 1944 limited Pramoj and Kunjara's roles for
the remainder of the war, the damage that had been inflicted on the relationships and morale of the Free Thai
members was irreversible.
The goal of independence, the Allies, and interpersonal politics among Free Thai members were the
interconnected factors that shaped the dynamic of the Free Thai movement. The Allies played an important part in
both forging and breaking bonds between the Free Thais, but the relationships among the Thais themselves were
what mainly influenced the Allies' perceptions of Thai politics and, in turn, determined their support, or lack
thereof, for the resistance. Moreover, the operation in China illustrates that Thailand's sociopolitical structure
wielded a tremendous influence on the dynamic of the liberation movement. The mission in 1943 was delayed and
the Free Thai Movement as a whole suffered because its members had been swept into a whirlwind of politics,
rivalries, and conspiracies. Their trust issues, which stemmed from their nation's complex political past and their
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preoccupation with the prospects of Thailand's political future, distracted them from their immediate and most
important task: to free their country from foreign domination.
"I have learnt that in fighting a war and bringing an orderly life to the Nation successfully, personal
animosity and grudge have no room in it. They blind you to the real facts which are the only thing that
leads one to the correct interpretations of events."
H.S.H. Prince Subha Svasti[153]

[1] Three Thai liberation groups are mentioned in this paper. They are now all known as one Free Thai Movement.
However, back in 1943, the group in the United States was the only one universally known as the Free Thai
movement (FTM). The group in Britain was a branch of the FTM. However, to avoid confusion and because the two
groups hardly worked together during the war, I will refer to the group as the British called it, the Free Siamese
movement (FSM). The underground resistance in Thailand initially called itself the National Liberation Movement
(NLM), so I would like to refer to it as such here. As for the Thai liberation effort as a whole, for the lack of a better
term, I will call it the Free Thai Movement with a capital M.
[2] When I began researching about the Free Thai Movement in Thailand, I was shocked by the little amount of
sources that I was able find. I then learned that the Free Thai Movement is probably the least appreciated period in
modern Thai history. In fact, the younger generation in Thailand has very vague ideas of what the movement was
about. The scarcity of documents and scholarly works on the subject was partly a result of the postwar political
turmoil that involved most of the Free Thai leaders. Due to the very complex and conflicted nature of Thailand's
postwar sociopolitical structure, sources written by members of the movement after the war lack discussion of
conflicts among Thai players and political issues.
Fortunately, declassified documents from the US and British national archives have made it possible to gain
insight into the mindsets of and the relationships between Free Thai members in the context of the war, untainted by
the memories of the political upheaval in Thailand during the postwar years. I myself was unable to gain access to
these documents, because they were only available to be viewed at the two national archives' facilities. For this
reason, I am greatly indebted to Dr. E. Bruce Reynolds, a professor of History at San Jose State University, whose
generosity has made it possible for me to write this paper. I am truly grateful that he was willing to share his
research with me and took the time to make copies of copious amount of documents and send them to me. Please
note that all USNA (United States National Archives) and PRO (British Publish Record Office) documents used in
this paper were provided to me by Dr. Reynolds, unless noted otherwise.
[3] Chintana Yossunthorn, Chak wannan theung wanni (Bangkok: Thana Press and Graphic, 2002), 60. Translated
from Thai: "เรือ
่ งทีเ่ ขียนนี้ ได ้ตัดตอนทีแ
่ สลงใจคนส่วนมากออกไป จนเกือบจะเป็ นหนังสือนาเทีย
่ วอยูแ
่ ล ้ว"
[4] Department of Curriculum and Instruction Development, The Ministry of Education of Thailand, Khabuankan
Seri Thai [The Free Thai Movement] (Bangkok: The Ministry of Education of Thailand, 1995), 55. Translated from
Thai: "กลุม
่ คนไทยเหล่า นีต
้ า่ งได ้ดาเนินการเคลือ
่ นไหวอย่างลับๆ โดยไม่ได ้ประสานงานติดต่อระหว่างกัน

่ สารเป็ นไปด ้วยความยากลาบาก
ทัง้ นีเ้ นือ
่ งจากสถานการณ์ทางด ้านสงครามในยุโรปและเอเชีย ทาให ้การสือ
นอกจากนัน
้ ปั ญหาทางการเมืองระหว่างประเทศ ยังเป็ นปั จจัยสาคัญทาให ้การดาเนินงาน 'ต่อ ต ้านญีป
่ น
ุ่ ' เป็ น ไปในลักษณะต่างกลุม
่
ต่างดาเนินการ"

[5] Sorasak Ngamcachonkulkid, "The Seri Thai Movement: The First Alliance against Military Authoritarianism in
Modern Thai History" (PhD diss., University of Wisconsin-Madison, 2005), 1.
Ngamcachonkulkid was influenced by the methods of German sociologist Max Weber. He applied the theory to
the structure of the new Thai urban and political society that began to emerge during the early 1930s alongside the
overthrow of the old system of absolute monarchy. But Ngamcachonkulkid perhaps sought too close a tie to the
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revolutionary past, and, in turned, isolated the Free Thai movement from the global context of World War II that,
just as much as the revolution of 1932, had a tremendous impact on the Thai wartime political developments.
By painting such a negative image of the Free Thai Movement, Ngamcahonkulkid's dissertation also came
under heavy fire by a fellow Thai scholar who was a member of the NLM, based in Thailand. In Suphot Dantrakul,
The Truth About the Free Thai Movement and Resistance Against Japan [ข ้อเท็จจริงเกีย่ ว
กับขบวนการเสรีไทยและการต่อต ้านญีป
่ น]
ุ่
(Institute of Social Science of Thailand, 2000), 155 -- the author protested that
Ngamcachonkulkid, "by claiming that this movement was formed because of [Thailand's] internal political conflicts,
which is a lie, is distorting history and is ungrateful to all that the Free Thai Movement has done for the nation."
Dantrakul further argued that the "movement was formed ... because Japan invaded Thailand. Thai patriots both in
Thailand and overseas, though had different ideals and political viewpoints, were unified in their love for the
country and its independence, and thus, together, formed a movement to resist the Japanese and liberate the nation."
The original statement in Thai is the following: สรศักดิ์ งามขจรกุลกิจ
"อ ้างว่าขบวนการนีเ้ กิดขึน
้ เพราะความขัดแย ้งทางการเมืองภายใน อันเป็ นความเท็จ เป็ นการบิดเบือน ประวัตศ
ิ าสตร์
และเป็ นการอกตัญญูตอ
่ คุณูปการของขบวนการเสรีไทยทีม
่ ต
ี อ
่ ชาติ ... ขบวนการนีเ้ กิดขึน
้ ... เพราะญีป
่ นบุ
ุ่ กไทย
คนไทยผู ้รักชาติทงั ้ ทีอ
่ ยูภ
่ ายในประเทศ และต่างประเทศ และทัง้ ทีม
่ อ
ี ด
ุ มคติ และทัศนคติทางการเมืองทีแ
่ ตกต่างกัน
แต่มค
ี วามเป็ นหนึง่ เดียวกันในความรักชาติรักแผ่นดิน มีความเป็ นหนึง่ เดียวกันในการเชิดชูเอกราชแห่งชาติและอธิปไตยแห่งชาติ
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